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ABSTRACT
This study examines data drawn from the game show Friend or Foe?, which is similar to the classic
prisoner’s dilemma tale:  partnerships are endogenously determined, players work together to earn
money, after which, they play a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game over large stakes: varying from
$200 to (potentially) more than $22,000.  If one were to conduct such an experiment in the
laboratory, the cost to gather the data would be well over $350,000.  The data reveal several
interesting insights; perhaps most provocatively, they suggest that even though the game is played
in front of an audience of millions of viewers, there is some evidence consistent with a model of
discrimination.  The observed patterns of social discrimination are unanticipated, however.  For
example, there is evidence consistent with the notion that certain populations have a general
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  The prisoner’s dilemma has become the classic example of the theory of strategy 
and its implication for predicting the behavior of players.  The equilibrium concept has 
been used in many disparate strategic applications, including economic, social, political, 
and biological competitions.  Indeed, its influence has extended well beyond scholarly 
circles, as people who have never been formally introduced to game theory typically are 
familiar with the basic story underlying the game:  two people form a team and rob a 
bank.  They are subsequently apprehended by the police and brought to the precinct 
under the suspicion that they were conspirators in the bank robbery.  Detectives explain 
to each suspect that even if neither confesses they are both looking at jail time (e.g., 2 
years) for the robbery.  If one confesses, however, the confessor goes free and the other 
serves substantial jail time (e.g., 10 years).  If both confess, then jail terms will be 
negotiated down (e.g., 5 years).  A simple transformation of this story produces many 
realistic economic circumstances, including oligopoly pricing, international trade 
negotiations, and labor arbitration.  
  Ever since the initial theoretical conjectures of Nash, economists have used the 
prisoner’s dilemma game as a basis for testing the predictions of noncooperative game 
theory.  Yet almost all of this evidence comes from laboratory experiments that involve 
small or imaginary stakes.1  In this study, I provide an initial exploration of strategic 
behavior in a natural prisoner’s dilemma experiment by examining individual decisions 
from the game show Friend or Foe?  The game show provides a simple and sharp form 
of the dilemma and parallels the classic prisoner’s dilemma tale:  teams are endogenously 
determined, players work together to earn money, after which the agents play a one-shot 
                                                           
1 For thoughtful surveys see Roth (1995) and Davis and Holt (1995).   2 
prisoner’s dilemma game over large stakes—varying from $200 to (potentially) more 
than $22,000.  An added advantage of these data is that they provide a test of whether, 
and to what extent, social discrimination is practiced.2 
Several interesting findings emerge.  First, in the series of observed shows, 
thousands of dollars were literally left on the table:  in nearly 25 percent of the 117 
games, both players chose not to cooperate, resulting in a net loss of nearly $100,000.  Of 
the remaining teams, in roughly 25 percent of the cases both players cooperated.  Second, 
stakes are not found to be a significant determinant of play, lending evidence consistent 
with the notion that the low stakes typically used in laboratory experiments are not 
problematic due solely to stakes considerations.  Third, while an empirical analysis 
examining the determinants of individual cooperation rates suggest little social 
discrimination exists, since teams are formed endogenously the data also permit an 
exploration of whether players exhibit discrimination when choosing their partners.  The 
data suggest that, in general, players use proper backward induction when selecting 
partners; but one anomalous finding is that in the partner selection process agents are 
biased against older participants.  The observed pattern of partner choices is consistent 
with a model of social discrimination wherein certain populations have a general 
“distaste” for older participants in the Becker (1975) sense.   
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  Section II discusses the Friend 
or Foe? gameshow and describes important caveats associated with using such data to 
draw inferences.  Section III summarizes the empirical results.  Section IV concludes. 
II.  The Natural Experiment 
                                                           
2 Independently, Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2005) have used Friend of Foe? data to explore social learning and 
coordination but do not examine discrimination or other questions addressed herein.     3 
As previous studies have noted, television game shows provide a natural avenue 
to observe real decisions in an environment with high stakes.  For example, Berk et al. 
(1996) study contestants’ behavior on The Price is Right to investigate rational decision 
theory.  Gertner (1993) and Beetsma and Schotman (2001) make use of data from Card 
Sharks and Lingo, respectively, to examine individual risk preferences.  Finally, Metrick, 
uses data from Jeopardy! to analyze behavior under uncertainty and players’ ability to 
choose strategic best-responses.  Each of these studies has provided a fresh look at 
important economic phenomena over large stakes that, short of a large experimental 
budget or having an experimental laboratory in an underdeveloped country, would be 
difficult to investigate outside of a gameshow environment.   
Data used in this paper are taken from original Friend or Foe? programs.  The 
game show Friend or Foe? premiered on June 3, 2002.  Importantly, all of these shows 
were taped in Santa Monica, CA, prior to the show’s television premiere.  I observed 39 
shows, each of which consists of six strangers, who at the beginning of the show are 
randomly split into two groups of three:  group 1 and group 2.  Each group 1 agent 
privately selects one player from group 2 to be his or her partner.  This first stage can 
therefore proceed in one of three ways:  1) all three group 1 agents select different 
partners.  The partnerships are then formed by these choices and the pairs proceed to the 
next stage of the show; 2) two group 1 agents select the same group 2 agent.  First, the 
group 1 agent whose choice did not coincide with another’s choice is paired with his or 
her group 2 selection.  Second, the group 2 agent who was chosen by two group 1 agents 
selects one of those group 1 agents to be his or her partner.  The remaining pair is then 
matched; or 3) all three group 1 agents choose the same group 2 agent.  In this case, the   4 
selected group 2 agent chooses one of the group 1 agents.  The remaining group 1 agents 
privately select one of the remaining group 2 agents.  If they again select the same 
person, he or she chooses one of the group 1 agents.  The remaining pair is then matched.   
Teams are therefore determined endogenously:  the six strangers become three 
groups of two via this selection process.  Each team is then separated into “isolation 
chambers” where trivia rounds are played.  The newly formed teams work together and 
agree on answers to trivia questions in order to build a “trust fund” potentially over three 
rounds.  In the first (second) round, four trivia questions are posed worth $500 ($1000) 
each.  In the third round, up to ten questions are asked, each worth $500.  Given that each 
team is initially endowed with $200, a team’s “trust fund” can range from $200 to 
$22,200; however, in practice, the largest trivia earnings in these data is $16,400.   
At the end of each round (there are 3 rounds in total) the lowest scoring team is 
eliminated.  Before the team is dismissed from the game show, the players must decide 
how their winnings are divided.  In making a decision, each player has a button, which no 
one else can see.  The division of winnings depends on whether the player depresses his 
or her button.  There are three possible outcomes: 1) “Friend-Friend” (i.e., cooperate-
cooperate)—if both players choose “friend” (do not depress the button), then the total 
winnings are divided equally between the two; 2) “Friend-Foe” (i.e., cooperate-not 
cooperate)—if only one player depresses the button, he or she receives the entire amount, 
leaving the other player with nothing; 3) “Foe-Foe” (i.e., not cooperate-not cooperate)—
if both players press the button, then both players walk away with nothing.   
Thus, this final stage of the game naturally sets up a prisoner’s dilemma with a 
weakly dominant strategy:  each player has an incentive to play “Foe” because she is   5 
never worse-off monetarily when playing “Foe.”  To my knowledge, little has been done 
empirically on non-cooperative games in such high-stakes setting.   
Caveats 
Before proceeding to the discussion of results, it is important to summarize 
potentially important caveats associated with using game show data for such an exercise.  
First, the contestant pool may not be a representative sample of the underlying 
population.  Second, play takes place in front of a large television audience, potentially 
attenuating certain behaviors.  For example, it is possible that contestants recognize that 
they are playing a repeated game with members of the audience and therefore future 
financial impacts might well be an important consideration when determining whether to 
cooperate or defect on the gameshow.  Indeed, one would expect that the more closely an 
individual’s actions are being scrutinized (e.g., the act is being televised or is taking place 
in front of one’s children), fairness concerns are likely to receive increased emphasis.  
Thus, defecting on a television show might very well have very negative consequences, 
even if the agent has no social preferences.3   
Besides plausibility, such intuition has empirical support.  For example, the effect 
of decreasing anonymity or confidentiality in classic linear public goods experiments 
leads to increased cooperative behavior (see, e.g., Masclet et al., 2003; Rege and Telle, 
2004).  And, List et al. (2004) report evidence that social isolation has important effects 
on stated preferences for environmental goods.  Perhaps making this overarching point 
most clearly are the data in List (2006).  List (2006) uses a series of laboratory and field 
experiments to explore the nature of social preferences among real market players in 
naturally occurring environments.  He reports that while agents drawn from a well-  6 
functioning marketplace reveal strong social preferences in tightly controlled laboratory 
experiments, when they are not aware that they are being observed, behavior in their 
naturally-occurring environment approaches what is predicted by self-interest theory. 
Third, the title of the game show, in and of itself, is suggestive, as is the oral 
introduction that the game show host, Kennedy, uses in every show:  you will “work 
together to build a trust fund….and ultimately decide to share as friends or fight over as 
foes.”  One aspect of the show that does resemble certain characteristics of many 
naturally-occurring environments is the fact that agents endogenously select into the 
market (the show) and select with whom to interact.  In many parallel laboratory 
experiments, such variables are determined exogenously.   
III. Results 
The top panel of Table 1 provides summary statistics at the individual level.  Of 
the 234 players, 49 percent were men and 78 percent were white.  The gameshow, which 
is taped in California, attracted 38 percent of its contestant pool from California and the 
contestants were from a broad age group:  from 18 to 61, with an average age of 31.  This 
mixture of subjects provides important variation to examine whether participant-specific 
characteristics influence behavior in prisoner’s dilemma games.   
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents an overview of monies earned in the trivia 
portion of the game, cooperation rates, and take-home earnings across a few broad 
classes of agents.  These figures show that, on average, teams earned $3,705 during the 
trivia portion of the game, indicating that the average prisoner’s dilemma game was 
played over $3,705.  On average, men earned the most in the trivia portion of the game 
($4,247), while non-whites earned the least ($2,825).  There is no discernible difference 
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across earnings profiles of young ($3,603) and older ($3,839) agents when I split the 
players along the first moment of the age variable.   
In terms of overall cooperation rates, 50 percent of subjects chose to cooperate.  
This figure is larger than cooperation rates observed in laboratory one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma experiments, which are typically around 33 percent (Shafir and Tversky, 1992).  
As previously noted, there are several potential explanations for such a disparity to exist, 
including subject pool differences, television audience effects, the monies are jointly 
earned, the stakes are large, partnerships are formed endogenously, and identities are not 
anonymous.  Combining trivia earnings with the cooperation rates maps into take-home 
earnings, which were on average much larger for men (younger agents) than women 
(more mature agents).  Indeed, men took home almost 70 percent more than women.  
This, of course, is due to two effects:  higher cooperation rates among women and higher 
trivia earnings among men.   
Constructing a simple matrix using gender, race, and age as cross-tab variables 
yields Table 2.  Table 2 provides team-level information pertaining to the level of trivia 
earnings (denoted stakes), cooperation rates, average take-home earnings, and efficiency 
rates (take-home earnings divided by trivia earnings).  For example, insights contained in 
Panel A complement Table 1, and suggest that women who are on all-female teams have 
a 56 percent cooperation rate (row 2 column 2), whereas findings contained in row 1 
column 1 suggest that men who are on all-male teams cooperate in only 48 percent of the 
observations.  This leads to a higher efficiency rate for all-female teams.  Interestingly, in 
mixed gender teams, cooperation rates are much different across men and women:   
whereas men cooperate at a rate of 43 percent, women choose to cooperate at a rate of 55   8 
percent.  In this case, men are showing a slight discrimination against women, 
cooperating slightly less (48 percent versus 43 percent) when paired with a female. 
Likewise, Panels B and C in Table 2 provide insights across race and age cohorts.  
The overall picture is that white agents cooperate more than non-whites, regardless of 
whether they are on all-white teams or inter-racial teams.  And, older agents are found to 
cooperate to a much greater degree than younger agents, regardless of the age of partner.  
The distribution of earnings in the mixed age pairs as well as the efficiency rates across 
the three cells highlights the considerable effects of such behavior.   
Rather than belabor the raw data further, to provide insights into team cooperation 
rates, I make use of the inherent ordering of the outcomes by coding team outcomes as 
equaling 0 if both players choose “not cooperate;” equaling 1 if one player chooses “not 
cooperate” and the other chooses “cooperate;” and equaling 2 if both players choose 
“cooperate,” and build a model around a latent regression of the form: 
Yi
* = Xi′β + εi,         ( 1 )  
where Yi
* is unobserved, Xi is a vector of team-specific variables, β is the estimated 
response coefficient vector, and εi is the well-behaved random error component.   
Although I do not directly observe Yi
*, I do observe an approximation of Yi
*: 
 Y i =     0 if Yi
* ≤  0,         (2) 
      1 if 0 < Yi
* ≤ φ1 
   2   i f   φ1 < Yi
* ≤ φ2. 
The φi are unknown parameters that are estimated jointly with β.  A few aspects of 
the estimation procedure merit further consideration.  First, since the φis are free 
parameters, there is no significance to the unit distance between the set of observed   9 
values of Y.  In fact, the outcomes represent a “cooperation ranking” and therefore one-
unit changes are not directly comparable.  Second, estimates of the marginal effects in the 
ordered probability model are quite involved because there is no meaningful conditional 
mean function.  I therefore compute the effects of changes in the covariates on the j 
probabilities: 
  ∂Prob[cell j]/∂Xi = [f(φj-1
 - Xi′β) – f(φj - Xi′β)]*β,   (3) 
where f(•) is the standard normal density, and other variables are as defined above.  By 
definition, these effects must sum to zero since the probabilities sum to one.   
Accordingly, I obtain threshold levels of cooperation rates by measuring how exogenous 
variable vector Xi affects ranked responses, Yi
*.  Xi includes dichotomous team regressors 
to explore the effects of team gender, race, age, and geographic residence on outcomes.  
For example, “Team Male” (“Team White”) equals 1 if both team members are male 
(white), 0 otherwise; “Team Mature” (“Team California”) equals 1 if both team members 
are 31 years old or older (reside in California), 0 otherwise.4   
Vector  Xi also includes two regressors to explore the potential importance of 
endogenous partner selection.  As aforementioned, in markets many times partners are 
endogenously chosen and this factor might be important.  The first variable indicates 
whether the individual became a partner by choice in the first selection round: 1
st Selected 
= 1 for both team members if the group 1 agent was the only person who selected the 
group 2 agent, 0 otherwise.  The second variable, 1
st Selected (Tie), equals 1 for both 
group members if a group 2 agent was chosen by at least two group 1 agents and 
subsequently was forced to choose his or her group 1 partner, 0 otherwise.  Intuition 
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players might be experienced game show participants.     10  
would suggest the reinforcement involved in the tie-breaking procedure would yield an 
even stronger bond between partners.  Finally, I include a variable that controls for 
stakes, or the level of money at risk, in Xi. 
Estimation results are contained in Table 3.  Column 1 contains the coefficient 
estimates from the model, which is statistically significant at the p < .05 level.  The 
results corroborate insights gained from the raw data:  older teams are more likely to 
cooperate, and all white teams cooperate less than mixed racial teams.  The results also 
highlight the significance of allowing partners to be determined endogenously:  those 
who were selected by one another to be teammates cooperate to a much greater extent 
than those who did not select to be teammates on the first attempt.  Although these 
coefficient estimates provide interesting insights, not much information beyond their 
statistical significance can be used since they are not marginal effects.   
To amend this situation, I present marginal effects in columns 2-4 of Table 3.  
The estimates can be read as follows: an all female team is 3 percent more likely to be in 
cell 2 (both players cooperate) than a mixed gender team.  Interestingly, the results show 
that more mature (young) teams are 15% (15%) more (less) likely to fully cooperate than 
mixed age teams.  And, the importance of the selection process is notable as well, as 
those teams that were formed by both agents choosing one another are 23 percent more 
likely to fully cooperate.  Interestingly, while the effect of stakes was marginally 
significant in column 1, its marginal effect is negligible. 
  One can dig a level deeper into the individual decision process by exploring how 
individuals play the game.  In this spirit, I estimate the following regression model at the 
individual level:  cooperatei = g(α + βzZ), where cooperatei equals 1 if agent i chooses to   11  
cooperate, 0 otherwise; g(•) is the standard logistic function (results are similar if I 
assume normally distributed errors); Z is identical to X but at the individual, rather than 
the team, level.5  Since these results corroborate evidence from Tables 1-3, I suppress 
them but note that individual-level attributes are correlated with cooperation rates:  males 
cooperate less than females, whites cooperate less than non-whites, older participants 
cooperate less than younger participants, and participants from California cooperate less 
than non-Californians.  Again, stakes are found not to matter, but the partner selection 
process does.  Finally, when I augment Z with observable partner characteristics, they are 
found to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels in the pooled data.   
Overall, from results in Tables 1-3 and the insights gained from the individual-
level model, I draw the following conclusions: 
Result 1:  Stakes do not have an important effect on play. 
 
Result 2:  Individual-level attributes are correlated with cooperation rates: 
women, whites, and older participants cooperate more than their peers. 
 
Result 3:  Partner attributes do not influence play significantly. 
 
Result 4:  How partners are determined influences play:  players cooperate 
more if they are able to select each other as partners.  
 
Result 1 provides an important validity check on the number of laboratory 
experiments that use low stakes.  In this sense, these results are consonant with recent 
results from dictator and ultimatum laboratory games that indicate the level of stakes has 
been negligible on proposers’ behavior (see, e.g., Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 
                                                           
5 It would have been nice to also include a regressor that indicated whether, and to what extent, each player 
contributed to the pool of earnings in the trivia stage.  Given that each team of two must agree on an answer 
before final submission (i.e., both team members must submit the same answer) and that the actual 
television broadcast only included select parts of the discussion between teammates, I found it too 
subjective to extrapolate information aired into construction of a “production variable.” 
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1999; Carpenter et al., 2005).  In terms of trust and gift exchange games, the laboratory 
evidence is mixed, as Fehr et al. (2005) report that fairness concerns play an important 
role for both low and high stakes games whereas Parco et al. (2002) find that raising 
financial incentives causes a breakdown in mutual trust in centipede games.  In sum, the 
data herein show that over much larger stakes variations than previously examined, play 
is not considerably affected by changes in stakes.6   
Besides its empirical significance, Result 2 might also serve as an external 
validity check of recent results from laboratory experiments.  For example, two recent 
studies that examine behavior in much different settings find similar results on gender 
effects.  Using laboratory experimental data, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that in 
dictator games women are much more likely than men to be “equalitarians”: choosing a 
division that gives equal payoffs.  Likewise, Eckel and Grossman (1998) eliminate all 
factors other than gender-related differences in selfishness and find that women are less 
selfish than men in dictator games.   
Results 3 and 4 are interesting in the sense that Result 4 highlights the importance 
of partner determination, a factor that is not often discussed and manipulated in 
laboratory experiments.  Result 3 indicates that partner attributes do not influence play.  
This result is inconsistent with previous laboratory results that suggests trusting behavior 
and trustworthiness rise with social connection (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000; Fershtman 
and Gneezy, 2001; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004).  Indeed, Andreoni and Petrie (2004, pg. 
6) note that “working with familiar others can reduce transactions costs, as familiarity can 
                                                           
6 The interested reader should see the excellent surveys on stakes effects in laboratory games in Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999) and Hertwig and Ortmann (2001).  Note that this result does not speak to the 
comparison between hypothetical and real stakes.  For a discussion of this comparison please see List 
(2001).   13  
enhance trust.”  Yet, this finding is consistent with players not discriminating against 
other players due to the “television” effect, which makes sense since discriminatory 
behavior should be attenuated in the game show environment because the agent’s actions 
are observed literally by millions of viewers.   
Nevertheless, it is clear from Result 4 that partner selection is crucial in 
determining play.  And, while discrimination is not observed at the level of the dilemma, 
the data are sufficiently rich to allow an exploration of whether discrimination is evident 
in the partner selection process.  In particular, I can analyze whether players accurately 
take into account the observable information of fellow players when choosing their 
partners or if they systematically bias their choices in a manner that is consistent with 
models of discrimination.   
To begin the examination, I estimate an earnings function of the following form: 
Earningsi =  δ′Xj + εij,         ( 4 )  
where Earningsi equals the amount person i would have earned had he played the strategy 
that maximizes his own payoff function for this single game:  trivia earnings*cooperate; 
cooperate equals 1 if the individual’s partner cooperated, 0 otherwise.7  In Xj, I follow the 
empirical analysis above and include observable characteristics for person j:  gender, 
race, age, and whether the person was a Californian.  Summary statistics in Table 1 and 
empirical estimates discussed above suggest that each of these characteristics influences 
trivia earnings and the propensity to cooperate.    
                                                           
7 In the discussion below I take “proper” backward induction as representing choices that maximize one’s 
own payoff function for this single game.  It should be noted that backward induction for a conditional 
cooperator may lead to a different result than for such a player (a conditional cooperator is an agent who 
prefers to cooperate with those who cooperate and prefers to punish those who do not cooperate).  And, 
given the caveats in Section II, I ignore that proper backward induction should account for the unobserved 
“larger game” that is taking place between the gameshow participants and members of the audience.  In   14  
Thus, estimation of equation (4) provides insights into the effects of a partner’s 
characteristics on the earnings of an agent who does not cooperate.  I present marginal 
effects estimates from the Tobit earnings model in column 1 of Table 4.  The results 
suggest a first finding: 
Result 5:  Partner attributes influence players’ profits:  white, older, and non-
Californian partners increase earnings  
 
These estimates also suggest an economically significant effect of these attributes.  For 
example, being paired with a white participant increases expected earnings by nearly 
$900; and, at the overall sample means, an additional year of age for your partner maps 
into a nearly $100 larger expected earnings.   
These estimates suggest that individual-specific observables matter, but the 
necessary next step is to model the partnership selection process.  In doing so, I take a 
structural modeling approach and assume that person i selects person j if expected 
payoffs,  πij, exceed the expected payoffs, πik, for all alternative K persons.  This 
structural approach models the payoff for person i choosing person j as 
  πij =  β′Xj + µij  ,        ( 5 )  
where Xj is a vector of observable person-specific characteristics that potentially affect 
payoffs, which include variables that measure expected trivia earnings and “willingness 
to cooperate” in the prisoner’s dilemma game.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
such a case, proper backward induction would include consideration of future financial impacts. 
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A well-known property of equation (5) is that if the µij follow a Weibull 
distribution and are independently and identically distributed, the probability that person i 
will select person j is given by:8 





(β′Xk),    (6) 
where K is the number of alternatives (the three group 2 agents), and parameters, β, are 
estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.   
Empirical results from estimating this discrete choice model are contained in 
columns 2-6 of Table 4.  I present estimates from a pooled model, and then delineate by 
gender and age.9  Empirical estimates suggest the following insight: 
Result 6:  There is evidence that agents statistically discriminate. 
Estimates in column 2 of Table 4 suggest that women, whites, and non-Californians tend 
to be chosen as partners more often than their counterparts.  The empirical result that 
women are preferred to men is ubiquitous:  across every specification, but one, this result 
is significant at better than the p < .10 level.  A similar finding occurs for white agents:  
every cohort prefers their partner to be a white participant.  And, a similar result follows 
for agents not from California.   
  These empirical results are consistent with the view that agents have correct 
beliefs about the empirical results from the earnings equation in column 1 of Table 4 and 
                                                           
8 The strong assumption that the error terms (µij) are independently and identically distributed imposes the 
“Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” (IIA) restriction on the predicted values.  This assumption poses 
problems since it stretches the bounds of credulity to assume that, for example, a person’s decision not to 
choose one player is independent of her decision to reject another player.  I tested for IIA via Hausman and 
McFadden’s (1984) specification test and found that the maintained assumption of independence of the 
stochastic terms in the utility function was valid in those cases where the Hessian did not become singular.  
9 I suppress discussion of empirical estimates from other groupings of the data (e.g., whites, non-whites, 
Californians, non-Californians, etc.), as they are similar to the broader group of empirical estimates 
presented in Table 4.     16  
correctly choose their partners.  Such evidence is consistent with the notion that agents 
use observable characteristics to make statistical inference about their prospective 
partners in the Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972) sense (statistical discrimination).  In this 
spirit, these results are consistent with participants using individual observables in an 
effort to maximize their own earnings.  In light of the literature that suggests people are 
not well calibrated in their probability judgments (see, e.g., Camerer, 1995), these results 
are quite surprising.  Perhaps even more surprising is that participants perform this well 
considering that all of the shows were taped prior to the television premiere.   
As well as agents statistically discriminate along certain observables, one result at 
odds with this insight is: 
Result 7:  Agents do not properly anticipate the effects of their partner’s age 
on potential earnings.   
 
This finding can be gleaned from empirical estimates in Table 4.  Column 1 of Table 4 
shows that older partners provide higher expected profits than younger agents provide, an 
effect that is statistically significant at the p < .05 level.  As Tables 1 and 2 highlight, this 
result is entirely due to older agents cooperating more than younger agents, rather than 
superior performance in the trivia questions.   
Column 2-6 in Table 4 illustrate that these higher earnings are generally not 
reflected in partner choices.  For example, in every specification, except for the case 
when mature participants are choosing, younger agents are preferred.  For women and 
younger agent selectors, the coefficients are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  The pattern of choices causes agents to lose thousands of dollars in earnings.   
Overall, Table 4 shows that agents typically perform quite well in using 
observables to select partners to maximize their earnings.  Yet, when it comes to drawing   17  
inference from prospective partners’ ages, all agents, except for the older agents, 
miscalculate the attractiveness of partnering with more mature players.  Indeed, selectors, 
particular women and younger agents, even favor younger agents in the partner selection 
process.  This behavior is consistent with several underlying models, one of which is a 
“taste” for discrimination in the Becker (1975) sense:  economic actors are willing to pay 
a financial price to avoid interacting with older agents.  Yet, much like many empirical 
studies in the literature on discrimination, while these findings appear to be more 
consistent with some agent types having a general “distaste” for others, selectors 
incorrectly applying statistical inference about partners, for example, cannot be ruled 
out.10  However, as Levitt (2004; p. 431) points out, a simple model of incorrect 
stereotyping, while perhaps descriptively valid, is “not a very satisfying economic model 
because it implies that individuals are making systematic errors.”   
IV. Concluding Comments 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand property—if each individual acts in a manner that 
maximizes his or her own profit, the total profit for the community will be maximized—
remains an important influence within the behavioral sciences.  Yet game theorists have 
proposed a simple situation in which promotion of self-interest does not unequivocally 
lead to globally optimal solutions:  the prisoner’s dilemma game.  Every year thousands 
of new undergraduate and graduate students are introduced to noncooperative game 
theory via simple illustrations and examples of the classic prisoner’s dilemma game.  To 
                                                           
10 Yet, using gameshow data from the Weakest Link, Levitt (2004) also finds evidence of taste-based 
discrimination against the older players.  One way to parse these theories is to use a series of field 
experiments wherein beliefs are elicited (List, 2004). 
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my best knowledge, however, there does not exist an empirical examination of behavior 
in a high stakes game that mirrors the classic prisoner’s dilemma tale.   
This study fills this gap by examining data drawn from a game show that is 
stunningly similar to the classic example.  If one were to conduct such an experiment in 
the laboratory, the cost to gather the data would be well over $350,000.  The results 
suggest a few major themes:  in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game over high stakes, 
play is not unduly influenced by the level of stakes.  Indeed, at every level of monetary 
stakes thousands of dollars are literally left on the table by agents playing the weakly 
dominant strategy of not cooperating.  A further insight concerns discriminatory 
behavior, which is indicated in the data.  For example, there is evidence that agents use 
observable characteristics to make statistical inference about their prospective partners.  
In this spirit, while participants make proper use of variables such as race, gender, and 
geographic residence in an effort to maximize their own earnings, they tend to under-
select older participants.  Such behavior is consistent with agents having a general 
“distaste” for such players.  While these findings have important implications, I view it 
apropos to highlight that any interpretation of results should keep in mind the various 
caveats discussed in Section II.     19  
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Table 1  Selected Characteristics of Participants 
 
 Mean  Minimum  Maximum 
 (Std.  Dev.)   
 
Gender (% male)  0.49 0  1 
  (0.50)  
 
Race (% white)  0.78 0  1 
 (0.42) 
 
Age  31.2 18  61 
  (8.63)  
 
% Californians 0.38  0  1 
 (0.49) 
 
n  234 ---  --- 
 
Outcomes Trivia    Cooperation  Take-Home 
 Earnings Rate Earnings 
 
Overall  $3,705 0.50 $1,455 
(n=234) (2977)  (0.50)  (2308) 
 
Men   $4,247 0.45 $1,834 
(n=115)  (3294) (0.50) (2734) 
 
Women  $3,183 0.56 $1,088 
(n=119)  (2541) (0.50) (1738) 
 
White  $3,957 0.53 $1,417 
(n=182)  (3105) (0.50) (2322) 
 
Non-White  $2,825 0.42 $1,587 
(n=52)  (2294) (0.50) (2274) 
 
Young (age<31)  $3,603 0.41 $1,592 
(n=132) (2805)  (0.49)  (2475) 
 
Mature (age≥31)  $3,839 0.63 $1,276 
(n=102) (3195)  (0.49)  (2070) 
Notes: 
1.  Gender (Race) denotes categorical variable: 1 if male (white), 0 otherwise; Age denotes actual age in 
years. 
2.  “Trivia earnings” denotes amount earned in the trivia portion of the game show; “Cooperation Rate” 
denotes the percentage of subjects that chose to cooperate; “Take-Home Earnings” denotes the amount 
of money actually taken home by the subject.   22  
Table 2  Summary Group Outcomes 
 
Panel A.  Gender 
 Male  Female 
Male  Stakes:  $5,291 
 
Cooperation rate: 0.48 
 
Avg. take-home: $2,201 
Efficiency:  0.83 
 
n=48 
Stakes:  $3,558 
 
Cooperation rates:  Male: 0.43; Female: 0.55  
 
Avg. take-home:  Male: $1,572; Female: $1,046 
Efficiency:  0.74 
 
n= 134 
Female   Stakes:    $2,623 
 
Cooperation rate: 0.56  
 
Avg. take-home: $1,142 




Panel B.  Race 
 White  Non-White 
White  Stakes:  $4,382 
 
Cooperation rate: 0.51 
 
Avg. take-home: $1,626 
Efficiency:  0.74 
 
n=134 
Stakes:  $2,772 
 
Cooperation rates:  White: 0.58; Non-white: 0.44  
 
Avg. take-home: White: $832; Non-white: $1,601 
Efficiency:  0.88 
 
n= 96 
Non-White   Stakes:    $3,450 
 
Cooperation rate:  0.25  
 
Avg. take-home: $1,425 




Panel C.  Age 
 Young  Mature 
Young (less 
than 31 years 
old) 
Stakes:  $3,714 
 
Cooperation rate: 0.40 
 
Avg. take-home: $1,307 
Efficiency:  0.70 
 
n=68 
Stakes:  $3,484 
 
Cooperation rates:  Young: 0.42; Mature: 0.63  
 
Avg. take-home: Young: $1,896; Mature: $907 




years old or 
older) 
 Stakes:    $4,436 
 
Cooperation rate: 0.63  
 
Avg. take-home: $1,900 
Efficiency:  0.86 
 
n=38   23  
Table 3: Ordered Probit Estimation Results
a,b,c 
 
 Marginal  Effects 
 Parameter 
Variable  Estimates  P(0) P(1) P(2)   
 
Team Male  0.05  -0.01  0.00  0.01   
 (0.23) 
 
Team Female  0.10  -0.03  -0.00  0.03     
 (0.22) 
 
Team White  -0.29#  0.08  0.00  -0.08    
 (0.18) 
 
Team Non-White  -1.89
# 0.55  0.02  -0.57     
 (1.12) 
 
Team Young  -0.50*  0.15  0.00  -0.15    
 (0.19) 
 
Team Mature  0.51*  -0.15  -0.00  0.15     
 (0.22) 
 
















#  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) 
Notes:   
a“Team” variables are dichotomous and equal 1 for whether the team is composed as such and 0 
otherwise.  For example, “Team Male” equals one if both players on the team are male, 0 
otherwise.   
bMarginal effects are calculated as changes in the covariates on the j probabilities:  ∂Prob[cell 
j]/∂Xi = [f(φj-1
 - Xi′β) – f(φj - Xi′β)]*β 
c*Significant at the p < .05 level; 
#Significant at the p < .10 level. 
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Table 4  Earnings and Partner Selection Estimates
1,2 
 
  Earnings     Selection Equation   
 Equation Pooled Men Women Young Mature 
    
 
Male   -91.07 -0.50*  -0.48
# -0.60*  -0.35  -0.93*
 
  (343)  (0.21) (0.31)  (0.31) (0.27)  (0.39) 
 
White 890.15*  0.60*  1.01*  0.26
  0.65
#  0.70 




  -0.05 -0.19
# -0.18
#  0.09 





  0.001 0.003
# 0.003
#  -0.002 
  (1.81)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
Californian -762.31*  -0.76
* -0.62
# -0.86*  -0.68*  -1.03* 
  (364)  (0.25) (0.38)  (0.33) (0.32)  (0.42) 
 
n 234  117  51  66  74  43 
Notes: 
1)  Column 1 estimates are obtained via a Tobit model and reveal how a partner’s 
characteristics influence the take-home earnings of a Nash player.  Thus, the dependent 
variable equals:  trivia earnings*cooperate, where cooperate equals 1 if the partner 
cooperated, 0 otherwise.  Columns 2-6 present empirical estimates are from a discrete 
choice logit model.  Parameter estimates reveal how characteristics of group 2 agents 
influence group 1 agents’ selections.  “Young” (“Mature”) are choosers who are less than 
(greater than or equal to) 31 years old.   
2)  Figures in parentheses are standard errors; *Significant at the p < .05 level; 
#Significant at 
the p < .10 level. 